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The philosophy of mathematics has provided insight on questions of foundations and 
mathematical truth; however, it has not been very fruitful in guiding the practice of mathematics. 
This paper attempts to find points of contact between a Christian worldview and the choice of 
mathematical projects and methods. Three areas are considered: (i) dubitability in current research, 
(ii) the intrinsic value of contemporary mathematics to contemporary society, and (iii) the 
affirmation of human value in the use of mathematics. Finally, a framework for valuing mathemat-





This paper began as an attempt to give an account for my research in the mathematical 
sciences. As I read in the area of philosophy of mathematics, I was struck by how little influence it 
seems to have on the actual practice of mathematics. This literature is very helpful in understand-
ing the changing role of postulates, culminating in non-Euclidean geometry and the dethroning of 
rationalism, or the tum-of-the-century search for logical foundations and how it was overtaken by 
Godel and by postmodemism in general. But it is not very helpful in guiding or justifying what 
most of us do in mathematics. 
It is particularly distressing that Christian perspectives on the philosophy of mathematics do 
not offer much guidance. In Christian thought one particularly expects normative guidelines. 
Certainly, some general motivations have been given: that all truth is God's truth, studying 
mathematics can glorify God by uncovering the truth he created, and that perhaps we can learn 
something of the nature of God by studying the nature of mathematics. But how do we decide 
what mathematics to do, or how to approach it? And have our motives kept up with the dramatic 
changes in mathematics and society? Are our motives consistent with our Christian worldview? 
By considering three issues that arise in the practice of mathematics, I will attempt to 
demonstrate how answers to these questions can be shaped by overtly Christian values. The three 
areas are (i) dubitability in current research, (ii) the intrinsic value of contemporary mathematics to 
contemporary society, and (iii) the affirmation ofhuman value in the use of mathematics. Before 
addressing them, I will try to lay my philosophical cards on the table by making some worldview-
level assertions that relate to mathematics. Finally, I will suggest a framework for valuing specific 
projects. Hopefully this framework will be provocative. From within the world of mathematics, 
constructing a value framework may seem irrelevant, since there are well-codified institutions for 
evaluating mathematical work and a great part of one's education is spent learning to recognize 
what counts as good mathematics. But if the starting point is God's kingdom, such a framework 
may be much needed. 
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2. A Philosophical Starting Point 
It seems to me that a Christian world view provides a strong basis for a philosophy of 
mathematics. It begins by recognizing God as the creator and the source of all truth. There is a 
very clear Christian answer to why mathematics works. God's creation is orderly; it possesses a 
uniformity of cause and effect I and is a consistent reflection of the unity of God's truth. The 
omniscience of God includes all mathematical knowledge that we might obtain.2 Under this 
perspective, truth is absolute, unchanging, consistent, and unified. Contradiction, or even separate 
bodies of knowledge that cannot be unified, are disallowed by the unity of God's truth. Mathemat-
ical knowledge, with its richness and consistency, is made possible by the richness and consisten-
cy of God's nature and creation. 
Many Christian writers take the ontological position that mathematical objects exist outside 
of our conception of them, either as a kind of Platonic form or in the mind of God. I would 
suggest that it is not necessary to take a position on the question of existence. Within the view of 
truth sketched above, the key questions about mathematical knowledge can be answered without 
deciding the ontology of what we use only semantically. The alternative to asserting that numbers 
exist, however, is not an uninterpreted formalism that denies the truth of mathematics but some 
other interpretation of mathematics. 
The key point is that mathematics is a description of the orderly creation of God. Attempts 
to explain why the world can be described so successfully using mathematics will inevitably return 
to the question of God's nature and why he chose to create what he did. Poythress (1974) 
advances theological arguments that God's nature is quantitative. I prefer to accept the evidence in 
creation and our ability to understand it using science, for "Shall what is formed say to him who 
formed it, 'He did not make me'?" (Isaiah 29: 16) and "Does the clay say to the potter, 'What are 
you making?"' (Isaiah 45:9) We can view the study of mathematics, then, as investigating God's 
truth, without fear that what we are seeking is illusory or contradictory. 
The question remains of whether we are capable of understanding God's truth, in 
particular, will human mathematics live up to the qualities described above? His creation is not 
only orderly, but capable of being governed and improved by people. Our image bearing is the 
key to the success of mathematics. In applications, "The a priori capability of man's created nature 
really corresponds to the a posteriori of what is 'out there,' because man is in the image of the One 
who ordained what is 'out there'" (Poythress p. 185). Internally, "It is our image bearing which 
gives us the mental equipment to do mathematics"3. The limitations of our mathematical reasoning 
that provoked the crisis in foundations can be understood in terms of our finiteness and fallenness 
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while still asserting the unity and constancy of God's truth, including his omniscient know ledge of 
mathematics. Mathematics is subject to error and revision. We are not perfect proof checkers, and 
sometimes fail to play by our own rules. We cut comers and fail to formalize, leading to an 
imprecise notion of proof, and our formal systems are sometimes inadequate in conforming to 
God's truth and his creation. 
While our image bearing gives us the ability to do mathematics, it does not make our 
mathematical knowledge the one correct description of reality. I would suggest the following 
answer to how we know mathematics is true, based on Barker (1964). He proposes an analytic, 
non-literalistic interpretation of number theory. Some number theory is analytic: It is known to be 
true a priori because it is the result of correct counting, which is in no way empirical, but relies 
only on a correct understanding of number words. Counting is a fundamental mental capability. 
Basic logic is also inescapably true, and so is considered a priori as well. Barker also suggests that 
counting is not reducible to logic, and arithmetical laws should be viewed as statements about 
counting, not logic or sets. They are analytic in the sense that only a know ledge of language is 
needed in order for us to know that they are true; they do not require synthesis with another kind of 
knowledge. At any rate, some of mathematics is known to be true a priori because it follows from 
counting and logic. This part of mathematics is similar to constructivist mathematics, and its 
epistemological basis is similar to intuitionism, with counting taken as innate rather than numbers. 
The rest of mathematics, such as irrational numbers and infinite sets, have the status of 
models or theories. As in the other sciences, they are not the only possible formulation. Just as 
several scientific theories may be useful in explaining empirical observations, several formulations 
or extensions of mathematics may be useful. This extension of mathematics need not be merely 
uninterpreted formalism, though parts of mathematics are certainly best described that way. It can 
have the status of a model: When combined with science it makes statements about the physical 
world, or it might make statements about the "counting" part of mathematics. These statements are 
not undubitable because they are part of a model and rely on its axioms. A good example to keep 
in mind is the Euclidean model of space. In summary, I am taking an a priori or intuitionist view 
of arithmetic and an empiricist view of extended mathematics. 
3. Dubitability in Current Research 
Contemporary philosophy of science, particularly the work of Kuhn and Popper, and its 
application to mathematics by Lakatos (1976},leads to a view of scientific knowledge as dubitable 
and subject to change. Instead of being the result of impartial empirical observation and reasoning, 
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scientific theories are seen as influencing observation and themselves being influenced by a wide 
variety of societal factors and world view presuppositions. Knowledge does not just progress 
steadily; theories are replaced when they become unwieldy and the community sheds one paradigm 
and adopts another. An illusion of steady progress is created by the desire for unified scientific 
explanations. Particularly in mathematics, there is the tendency to reinterpret old results to fit them 
into the new paradigm. Euclidean geometry is still "true" if we interpret the parallel postulate as an 
arbitrary assumption rather than a self-evident fact. 
Experience and faith commitments lead me to embrace a limited dubitability. Like most 
mathematicians, I do not think that most mathematics, including the area I work in, will be affected 
by Godel's incompleteness or erased by future "revolutions". However, I expect mathematics to 
change and be adjusted. Propositions that are widely believed to be true, such as "P is not equal to 
NP" (there are no fast algorithms to a certain collection of hard combinatorial problems), may be 
false. Results involving subtle concepts of infinity may be reinterpreted to have different 
assumptions or proof methods. Applications will certainly change. 
Dubitability seems germane to many practical methodological questions. Should one use 
the computer to conduct numerical tests and draw conclusions from them, do symbolic manipula-
tion, or execute a long proof? Is it wiser to spend time checking results of others or to assume that 
they are correct and use them? Is it more effective to focus on a well-defmed field and work out 
the implications of prior definitions and partial results or to try decidedly different definitions, 
problem or methods? How does one choose between the modeling approaches that can be used to 
describe a physical system and translate it into mathematics? 
In my specialty of operations research, dubitability has increased because of the interweav-
ing of computer experiments with proofs. The question of whether an algorithm converges may be 
answered by proof or by numerical experiments on a computer. Determining the speed of an 
algorithm on typical problems is almost always done by computer experiments, since the 
construction of algorithms outpaces the ability to analyze their rate of convergence. After an initial 
period where computer results were being reported in a variety of ways that were impossible to 
reproduce or verify, e.g., "it ran in five minutes on my computer", standards were instituted for 
the reporting of computer results. These standards help to define the particular problem that was 
solved and the amount of computation required, so that in principle the results could be verified. 
However, the standards are only being used in the small part of my field that focuses on finding 
faster algorithms for some very old, well-defined problems. Much of the "cutting edge" looks for 
algorithms for an expanding list of new problems, or uses the computer to gain other insights into 
a problem. In these areas there are essentially no standards being used for reporting computer 
work. How reliable is it? Anecdotal evidence suggests that computer-generated numerical results 
in this field are often inaccurate and occasionally just plain wrong. 
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The fundamental shift that seems to have occurred is that instead of verifying results by 
exact replication, the standard for verification has become an inexact one of similarity. For 
example, in a recent research paper I showed a computer-calculated optimal policy for a model of a 
manufacturing system. The policy consists of a two-dimensional lattice with each point labeled as 
producing nothing, producing type 1, or producing type 2. Another researcher at Stanford solved 
the same problem, using a slightly different algorithm, and obtained the same policy. I took this as 
verification of my computer work. In fact, there were many intermediate calculations that I know 
must have differed, because we used many different approximations. The fact that we obtained the 
same answer does not guarantee, or even strongly suggest, that we would obtain the same answer 
on other cases. The algorithms we used will never be checked in a detailed sense because they are 
not in themselves of interest. The research goals were to test other, approximate methods and to 
gain insights into what the policies look like. This bit of knowledge has now been added to the 
vast pool and will probably never be checked further. Is it correct? Well, the results are probably 
close. But if they are used in certain ways, say as counterexamples to "disprove" a conjecture, 
then the level of confidence in our mathematical results has taken a great blow. Of course, the 
failure to verify or duplicate numerical results also creates a much larger vulnerability to scientific 
fraud. 
Dubitability has also increased with regard to analytical results. Davis and Hersh (1986) 
describe mathematical justifications as rhetoric because they are intended to convince a mathemati-
cian in that specialized field. In addition to the limitations of logic and proof that make a verifica-
tion from first principles or logic impossible, there are pitfalls that have nothing to do with 
foundations. As specializatioh and the volume of publication increases, the fallibility of what is 
published also increases. In the mathematical sciences, writers and referees may have less 
background in mathematics and less commitment to a professional principle of accuracy. Results 
that are useful in the computer age may be much lengthier and messier than what was viewed as 
publishable in an earlier age. I have twice encountered results that had made their way into books 
that were incorrect in significant ways. In one case a proof neglected some cases and the theorem 
needed to be restricted. In another a lengthy algebraic result, not derived in the book or its 
refere~ces, contradicted a property stated in the book; believing the algebra and other researcher's 
examples that supposedly refuted the property threw me off track in my research. These examples 
do not threaten the core mathematical results that have been repeatedly scrutinized. No one thinks 
such core results will be refuted by checking the algebra. Rather, their effect is to change my 
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levels of belief, or what I accept as true, in my work. To practice mathematics at all I must believe 
that it is possible to know mathematics; that my reasoning will not lead to contradictions and that I 
can separate truth from falsehood. Yet I have learned to hold results outside of this core (and much 
of what I know is outside of the core) at a slight distance. I do not have time to check everything 
that I use or to check my results in every conceivable way. When contradictions do arise, I am 
now more inclined to suspect published results that led to the contradiction. I do not have a very 
clear conception of what should be taken as core, but I would tend to describe it narrowly. 
This view of mathematics, including a limited dubitability, seems to have implications for 
choosing research directions. First, it places a premium on making sure we understand something 
before we use it. When analyzing models, the focus would be on understanding simple models 
rather than doing computation with complex models that are potentially more accurate but not 
understood. Next, it justifies mathematical rigor in the applied areas where such rigor is often left 
behind, since this rig.or may overturn what was considered obvious. Of course, such rigor is very 
costly and we must have faith in our ability to tell which stones to look under. Finally, I think we 
should hold the paradigms and research programs of our specialties as dispensable. For example, 
in my field there are three approaches to modeling a manufacturing system: discrete, continuous 
with discrete stochastics, and continuous with continuous stochastics. A researcher's choice of a 
model depends mostly on who their adviser was, not which is best in a particular situation. 
Pressures to become very adept at just one approach should be resisted. Like proof methods, we 
need to know a variety of modeling approaches to pick the one that works best in a given situation. 
On the other hand, questions such as whether to use a continuous or discrete model are often a 
matter of taste--either will do. In this case, knowledge of the different approaches can reduce 
duplication of effort. There really is no justification for redoing an earlier paper using an alternate 
modeling philosophy. More important, it seems to me, is to look beyond the assumptions of a 
research program. We should ask what other problems or models not being considered are worthy 
of our attention and carefully consider what makes a problem of interest. 
4. Rethinking Intrinsic Value 
One approach to justifying mathematical work, in the spirit of G. H. Hardy·(1940), is to 
eschew usefulness as a motive and give justifications very similar to those used for art. Timeless-
ness, beauty, and particularly truth are emphasized. I will call this approach intrinsic value. A 
second approach is to point out the many historical examples where "pure" mathematics was later 
put to unanticipated use, so that no mathematics can really be labelled pure or inapplicable. Two 
frequently cited examples are hyperbolic geometry in general relativity and finite groups in 
elementary particle theory. Essentially the same reasoning--that there may be unexpected applica-
tions--is used to justify basic science. I will argue that today's mathematics and today's social 
values require a rethinking of the intrinsic value argument, as well as a more nuanced view of 
potential applications. 
Hardy's defense includes the assertion that mathematics is a relatively harmless discipline. 
In the isolationism and the rigid leisure class of 1930's England, such a negative justification was 
somewhat persuasive. But justifying mathematics today requires a much stronger argument. In 
the intervening half a century, society--and normative concepts of a good society--have shifted 
toward an economic perspective of interdependency and productivity. Society no longer accepts 
the notion that doctors should decide how much is spent on health care, that NASA should decide 
how much is spent on space, or that scientists should decide how much is spent on research. 
Symbolic of this change was the cancellation of the superconducting supercollider project, which 
clearly offered the potential for new knowledge. The productivity pressures being faced in other 
occupations are beginning to be felt in academia. In mathematics, teaching is being reformed and 
research funding is being scrutinized for tangible results such as educational impact or collabora-
tion with industry. Corporate and foundation funding is generally even more focused on 
anticipated applications, rather than the intrinsic value of mathematics. These pressures do not 
simply reflect temporary budget difficulties. They also demonstrate the shift toward a society in 
which professions are subject to external scrutiny and the resulting pressures for productivity and 
societal value. 
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Certainly these pressures affect how funding is pursued. But should they influence how we 
value mathematics? In particular, how well do arguments for the intrinsic value of mathematics 
line up with a Christian worldview? Faculty at a Christian college, having acknowledged God's 
sovereignty in their life, are under an obligation to work for God's kingdom in their scholarship. 
Personally, I cannot accept the blanket statement that any research, no matter how arcane, can be 
kingdom work if it seeks to uncover more of the truth that God has created. The view that any 
research is worthwhile, even worshipful, seems to overlook the realities of human suffering, 
limited time, and limited resources. Thus, whatever value mathematics has must be balanced 
against other priorities. Mathematics is not done in a vacuum. 
While expectations have risen in the last half century, the changing face of mathematics has 
also affected the argument for intrinsic value. The maturing of mathematics and its focus on 
computation have had significant affects. ·Keith Devlin ( 1997) addresses the issue of maturity in 
his article "The End of Mathematics", where he distinguishes between "enlarging our fundamental 
84 
understanding of the universe" and "tidying up the loose ends". Large extensions, fueled by 
applying mathematics to new domains, cannot proceed indefinitely. Indeed, he writes that "The 
Golden Age of mathematical expansion may well be over." He also makes an argument of 
diminishing returns in mature sciences such as chemistry. In mathematics, with fragmented 
subdisciplines and a huge volume of publications, it becomes very difficult to argue that a 
particular piece of research contributes in any meaningful way to the pursuit of truth. Certainly the 
notion of diminishing returns applies to the current situation in mathematics. 
The resurgence of computation in mathematics also seems at odds with valuing mathemat-
ics as the pursuit of fundamental truths. The computer has coupled mathematics much more 
closely with applications. Now, it is possible to ask fundamental questions about computational 
mathematics. In my specialty of operations research, a good example is whether or not there is a 
polynomial time algorithm for linear programming. However, most research in these areas is 
driven by the goal of computing, not the pursuit of fundamental truths. Even the fundamental 
questions in these areas might not qualify as "deep". Would a mathematician without a computer 
be interested in them? 
Another aspect of intrinsic value is the unchanging, or timeless nature of mathematical 
facts. Mathematics has an immutability to it. Taking the philosophical position that mathematics 
discovers God's eternal, unified truth, mathematics can have profound value. When this reasoning 
is applied to current work, however, two problems appear. First, most mathematicians are 
working on what I described earlier as extended mathematics, not arithmetic. Its status, I argued, 
is more that of a model than a priori truth. It may be internally consistent and have the standing of 
a successful scientific theory, but cannot claim to be the unique description of a pre-existent truth. 
In this view, rather than saying God created infinite sets, one would say God created a world that 
can be understood through infinite sets. The more sophisticated the mathematical object, the more 
difficult it is to assert that it has an intrinsic, appointed place in the creation. A s~cond problem is 
that these objects, and the questions being posed about them, often appear to be contingent on 
current developments in mathematics or applications. History is likely to judge much less of 
today' s work as "timeless" than in previous eras when the community was smaller and the 
questions more basic. Of course, even the most obscure mathematics can be timelessly true. But 
more fundamental, general results are timeless in a stronger sense. As the work turns to more 
detailed or esoteric questions, some of the timelessness is lost. 
In contrast, the aesthetic aspect of mathematics seems as strong today as ever. This may be 
due to the inexhaustibility of creativity. One might say there are more elegant proofs than 
important theorems. Beautiful results can be obtained in all branches of mathematics, even if the 
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motivation was quite pragmatic. A concern might be the increased complexity, or "messiness", of 
the problems being solved today. Long proofs, and particularly computer-aided proofs, are less 
likely to command aesthetic respect. On the other hand, fractal images and computer visualization 
have brought great attention to the beauty of mathematics. 
To summarize, intrinsic value cannot be used as a blanket justification for all mathematics 
being done today. It must be applied selectively and balanced against other priorities in God's 
kingdom. If we view these priorities as primarily social, we must make intrinsic value arguments 
that ultimately talk about benefit to society,though in the broadest sense, including artistic and 
other kinds of value. Hence, the ability to communicate the work beyond the specialists takes on 
added importance. One of the criteria that guides mathematical work is relevant here. Topics are 
more credible when they can be simply stated and recognized by non-specialists. Certain simply 
stated problems seem to be relevant because they are an unavoidable test of the machinery. 
Studying these problems helps explore fundamental patterns, building confidence in the mathemati-
cal system or uncovering new methods for other problems. This type of problem should not 
involve generalization or new definitions, but merely ask questions about objects that are 
considered important for other reasons. 
5. Affirming Human Value 
Many mathematician's view of their work seems quite devoid of moral values. They might 
have an uneasiness about working in the defense industry, a vague hope that their research will 
contribute to the progress of society, and a commitment to truth. When applications are consid-
ered, one might think that the field itself--medical, defense, etc.--has moral content but the mere act 
of applying mathematics to it is morally neutral. This common response is what Poythress calls 
the dogmatism of neutrality: Mathematics is objective and morally neutral, so its application does 
not raise any ethical questions that are not inherent in the area to which it is applied. In fact, there 
are a number of ways in which using mathematics has profound implications. One concern is 
dehumanization. For mathematicians, Davis and Hersh 1986 are surprisingly alarmist on this 
issue: "When a man steps up to a bakery counter and takes a number, he is sped on his way, and 
that is good. But when he takes a number, he becomes, in part, a number, and there's the rub."4 
Dehumanization is not new, and the notion of information systems and computer technology as 
dehumanizing and replacing human contact can be argued both ways. More relevant to a world 
view is the belief in measurement that accompanies social applications. 
The use of quantitative methods to make social decisions, which grew rapidly in conjunc-
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tion with the computer age, brings with it a unique set of attitudes and dangers. Davis and Hersh 
consider the example of standardized testing for college and career placement (p. 93). The very 
process of testing reveals a belief that the quality in question is quantifiable, measurable, and 
predictable. In an attempt to measure something the test creates a new artifact, test-taking ability, 
that affects the educational system, spawns its own industry, e.g., SAT preparation, and shapes 
our view of people. Just as a materialist view limits the world to that which can in principle be 
quantified and observed, social tools such as placement tests engender a view of the world that is 
limited to that which can in practice be measured or mathematized. "As we mathematize the world, 
we proceed to lose or to throw away those parts of the world that cannot be mathematized. What 
isn't mathematized seems not to exist, even never to have existed." (p. 98) The very act of 
collecting data about people conveys the sense that they can be quantified and measured. Applying 
statistical theory to them, such as recognizing that characteristics measured from a large group of 
people fit a normal or bell curve, suggests that people can be studied using the same methods as the 
physical sciences. 
The methodology of the decision sciences points out a particular dilemma. In many 
government and business settings, mathematical models do a fairly good job of identifying the key 
choices, which become decision variables of the model, and constraints (logical, physical, resource 
limitations, etc.). To guide decisions, a criterion or objective is usually selected. The model is 
then used to find the choices that give the optimal value of the objective, such as the maximum 
profit. The appeal of the model and the mathematical nature of the process tend to give credibility 
to the results. However, the criterion contains all the difficulties of decision making. Different 
people involved are likely to have conflicting criteria. The modeler may end up choosing the 
criterion because no one else understands the model. In my field of manufacturing scheduling, for 
example, the criterion of minimizing the makespan (the time until the last of a set of jobs is 
completed) was once proposed solely because it was mathematically tractable. It has since led to a 
whole school of research with little or no relevance to manufacturing. Another difficulty is that 
optimizing a single criterion may not reflect the way that options are ranked by the people involved. 
For example, a manager may not want optimal profit but merely. profitability, and have other 
criteria for ranking among profitable options. Mathematicians who do optimization seem almost 
professionally trained to ignore these issues. But values simply cannot be avoided when mathemat-
ics is put to prescriptive, decision-making use. 
Along with all scientists, mathematicians face the danger of naturalism, thinking that only 
the natural world exists because we spend our lives studying it, and scientism, thinking that 
scientific knowledge is the only kind of knowledge. The rare and specialized skills of a mathemati-
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cian make it easy to be more aloof from the affairs of the world than an honest response to God's 
command to love your neighbor allows. A mathematician may feel that he or she is not quite as 
good as other people at doing things outside their profession. On the other hand, outsiders are 
dramatically less adept at doing mathematics. If the mathematician wants to excel, then he or she 
has a strong motive to stick to mathematics. The academic culture encourages aloofness through 
specialization, the solo nature of most research, and the limited rewards for interdisciplinary work. 
Even the current efforts at curriculum reform focus on how to teach mathematical problem solving, 
not how to relate mathematics to other topics in engineering, biology, or business. 
All of these areas point to the need for a broadly contextual framework for thinking about 
mathematics. For the Christian, such a context is even more essential because truth is holistic and 
God-given. This holistic view of truth and an intimate relationship with God is the grounding 
from which a person's life and work can emanate. Fleshing out such a ground or framework is 
largely an individual matter of understanding one's vocation. Several principles may be helpful in 
shaping a more individual response. The Christian recognizes that neither the objective level of 
truth ~or the subjective level of relationship can be fulfilled without the redeeming work of Jesus 
Christ. Christ provides not the key to doing mathematics but the key to understanding its 
relevance. 
At the objective level, knowing about God's truth, his creation, and his love, we can 
understand in a deeper way what we are doing when we study mathematics. In this framework 
mathematics can be studied without falling into a false perception of autonomy. Mathematics 
conforms to God's truth and assists in understanding reality. Recognizing the transcendency of 
God's truth and his creation relative to our mathematical knowledge prevents naturalism from 
creeping into our mathematized world view. Acknowledging transcendency also fosters a humility 
regarding mathematical ways of knowing that reengages us with other disciplines and aspects of 
life. 
At the subjective level, knowing our role in Christ's redemptive work puts a career in 
mathematics in a relational context. Matpematics is relevant not only because it conforms to truth, 
but as a human activity that can affirm human value. We can pursue excellence and give glory to 
God, treat people with dignity and compassion, and include in our teaching our understanding of 
the nature of mathematical knowledge. Finally, when we solve problems or do research, we can 
seek to let the welfare of others influence our choice of topics. How a Christian worldview might 
guide our choice of topics is considered in the final section. 
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6. Choosing Mathematical Topics 
In this section I propose some criteria, motivated by a distinctly Christian worldview, that 
could be used to choose among mathematical topics in research or the curriculum. I do not claim 
that they are complete or balanced. However, I suggest that applying an evaluative framework 
derived from a worldview, not a set of criteria internal to mathematics, is a worthwhile exercise. 
Dissemination. This is a very common expectation; however, we might be inclined to disregard its 
moral value precisely because it is an expectation placed on us by our deans. Other than training 
our minds, our work influences the world through other people. Telling them about it is just as 
important as doing it. In addition to communicating clearly, we should recognize that advocating 
for a good idea is an important job, remembering that models and paradigms compete. Balanced 
against this imperative is the recognition that most of the deluge of published material will not be 
used in any significant way or read by many. Hence, we should seek the form of dissemination 
appropriate for our work, which may be the classroom, a departmental seminar, a presented paper, 
a conversation with a colleague, or a real application. 
Next are four criteria, at least one of which might be expected of our work. 
(1) Understanding the nature of mathematics. Some topics, of course, are good training for doing 
more mathematics. Others point out the nature of mathematics and its limitations, such as 
dependency on axioms or formal incompleteness. Cultivating this understanding is particularly 
important to developing a Christian world view that sees mathematical and scientific study as an 
activity done in relation to God that conforms to his truth. History, foundations, and philosophy 
of mathematics would be pertinent to this objective. 
(2) Simply stated problems. As noted before, certain simply stated problems seem to be relevant 
because they explore fundamental relationships in the mathematical system. 
(3) Actual application. By this I mean not "applied mathematics" but the use of mathematics to 
gain knowledge or produce something in another field. Such work is inherently interdisciplinary. 
The value of work under this criterion is determined by the end that it serves. 
( 4) Potential application. Much mathematical work, including applied mathematics, is justified by 
asserting that it may be used in the future. Most of it never is. At the risk of sounding like a 
budget cutter, I suggest that we often could know this beforehand, or at least know which work is 
less likely to be used. For applied mathematics, where the intended area of application is known, 
we might ask: What sequence of further work would conceivably lead to its implementation? Who 
proposed the model being studied and how close are they to the application? For pure mathematics 
we might ask: Is the field unified? Are constructive results and computation imaginable, or only 
existence results? Does anyone outside of the field know about it, and if not, why? 
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These criteria can also provide a context for discussion of curriculum revision. F0r 
example, finding the maximum of a function using the method that we teach in calculus may only 
meet criterion (1); it reinforces the relationship between a function's graph and its derivatives, but 
is not used in applications to find a maximum unless the function has parameters or lots of 
variables, which we don't consider. In contrast, finding the zero of a function by Newton's 
method may meet criterion (1), (2), and (4); (1) because it introduces iterative techniques which are 
widely used in applied mathematics, (2) because it is a realistic solution method to a basic 
mathematical problem, and ( 4) because our students may use it doing scientific research or other 
work. 
I have argued that a philosophic framework of value--and in particular a Christian 
worldview--can guide the choice of projects, contribute to some methodological issues related to 
dubitability, and help affirm human value in a highly quantified society. I have asserted that some, 
but not all, mathematical work can be seen as valuable to the kingdom of God. The challenge, 
then, is to develop a more conscious scheme for valuing mathematical work, based not upon what 
is interesting to the mathematician but what is relevant to our world. 
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